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Abstract. Amajor limitation of open P2P networks is the lack of strong
identities. This allows any agent to attack the system by creating multi-
ple false personas, thereby disrupting the overlay network’s connectivity
and sabotaging its operation. In this paper, we explore practical ways
to defend P2P networks from such attacks. To do so, we employ a game
theoretic approach to the management of each peer’s list of known nodes
and to the overlay construction mechanisms that utilize this list. We con-
sider the interaction between defender and attacker agents as a zero-sum
game. We show that the cost of attacks can be driven up substantially if
the defender utilizes available information about peers it chooses to con-
nect to, such as their IP address. In addition to theoretical analysis of
the underlying game, we apply our approach to the Bitcoin P2P network
and derive effective strategies that guarantee a high safety level against
attacks.
1 Introduction
P2P networks are utilized as an underlying communication layer in many appli-
cations such as Bitcoin [9], BitTorrent [10], and DHTs [13]. Unfortunately, they
are extremely vulnerable to isolation attacks in which individual nodes that wish
to participate in the network connect only to attackers and are effectively quar-
antined from all other honest participants. Attackers can then distort the view
of nodes regarding events in the network, filter their messages, change, or delay
them at will.
Attacks of this sort give attackers great power. One prominent example is the
Bitcoin protocol [9], in which isolated nodes can have their computational power
subverted to attack the rest of the network, or may be blocked from issuing
transactions.
In this paper we seek to make the attacker’s job more difficult by suggesting
strategies for the peers in the P2P network to successfully avoid being quaran-
tined, unless the attacker invests a great deal of resources. In particular, our work
models the interaction between the attacker and the defender as a game. The
strategy space of the attacker is to choose the nodes to corrupt in the network
(at a cost per node), while the defender’s strategy space consists of the different
sets of nodes he can connect to. Our model leads to practical policies; We suggest
ways to manage the limited buffer from which agents choose connections. Our
work falls in the general category of security games: We consider the attacker
and defender as rational agents that seek to maximize their utility.
The main idea that we utilize to increase the cost for the attacker is to take
advantage of properties of the connections to peers to try and pick connections
that the attacker would be unlikely to control all at once. In the main example,
we take inspiration from Bitcoin’s P2P formation and consider the IP subnet
mask of the peers. Our main assumption is that once an attacker purchases an
IP address in some range of IPs, it is cheap to gain access to other similar IPs.
Our peer-selection strategy in this case will tend to be biased towards selecting
peers from many different IP ranges. This affects the way we should manage the
IP addresses’ buffer. Our main result (Theorem 4) states that we can implement
a safety-level strategy for this game, using only limited memory in which the
IPs are stored. Our contribution is thus a highly practical one.
Current P2P network formation The mechanisms through which P2P clients
choose their connections can vary, but most use the following general technique:
Once an initial connection is established with a node (usually with the aid of a
centralized server that helps to bootstrap the process), nodes share the IP ad-
dresses of others with their connections, and maintain lists of possible peers to
connect to. Such potential connections are stored in buffers and often exchanged
to keep the lists populated with “fresh” addresses. Therefore, the core two de-
cisions to be made are: (i) how to select which nodes to evict from a full buffer,
and (ii) how to select nodes to connect to.
A naive approach is to form connections to uniformly selected nodes in the
buffer (as such random graphs are typically well connected) and to evict nodes
uniformly at random from an overflowing buffer. Other approaches involve re-
moving the oldest IPs, assuming that they are the ones most likely to be stale.
The susceptibility of naive strategies Attackers find it cheap to replace all
the IPs in the buffer of the victim with IPs of attacker nodes (or with un-assigned
IP addresses). The defender then fails to connect to other honest nodes and is
quarantined by the attacker.
There are two approaches to an isolation attack: Sybil attacks [3], in which
the attacker creates many identities to increase his chance of getting connections;
and Eclipse attacks [12], wherein the attacker increases the visibility of each of
his nodes according to the peers’ selection algorithm (e.g., advertising its own
IP more aggressively). If the defender receives many IP addresses belong to the
attacker, and naively evicts nodes for his buffer in order to store these new
addresses, then the buffer will be overrun and the node will not be able to
connect to any honest peers.
Bitcoin employs a more sophisticated eviction strategy, sorting IP addresses
into buckets by combining the IP of the sender node with the IP address in the
message itself. Recent work shows this mechanism to be susceptible as well, as
it still allows attacker to overrun the buffer easily [5].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section
we briefly review related work, then in section 2 we define utility functions for
the players, the strategy space and the agents’ memory buffer. Section 3 shows
results for the game without any restrictions on the buffer size. In section 4 we
restrict the size of the memory buffer and derive the safety-level strategies for
the defender. Section 5 addresses a specific implementation of the cost function
and contains our main practical theorem. Finally, subsection 5.1 evaluates our
method as implemented on the Bitcoin network, using real data that we crawled,
and compares the result to other benchmarks. We conclude and discuss future
work in section 6.
1.1 Related Work
Douceur [3] was the first to expose the problem of multiple identities (Sybils)
in P2P systems lacking strong identities. Many such systems have since been
shown to be vulnerable to such attacks [13].
Bitcoin, a P2P currency system [9], was designed to work as an open system
with no strong identities. Its overlay formation is thus susceptible to attacks [5]
[1]. Botnets are often structured like P2P networks, and their susceptibility to
such attacks has been used to attack the botnets themselves [6,7].
One approach to defend from Sybils was to utilize a social network to form
the peers’ connections [14,15] (Sybils are assumed to have few connections to
honest participants in this setting). Unfortunately, most settings do not have
this additional network of relations among peers to use for overlay formation.
Another approach is to make it feasibly hard to create many entities by having
to solve a computational puzzle [16], but this could be difficult to accomplish in
different networks, if the nodes lack computational power (e.g., mobiles).
The approach of modeling the interaction between attackers and defenders
using game theoretic tools is well established [8]. A series of papers on se-
curity games deals with several variants of such problems. These include the
ARMOR project for security at airports [11], resilience to cyberphysical control
systems [17], and information security [4].
2 Model
We assume the attacker wishes to separate the defender node from all other hon-
est nodes. We model this as a game between the defender and the attacker. The
first model that we examine assumes (unrealistically) that the defender knows
all the nodes in the “universe” V and is unrestricted by memory considerations.
We later use this as a building block for the second model in which the defender
has a limited knowledge and memory buffer.
It is important to note that our model was created to defend from attacks on
a single node. This is not the general case, where the attacker may try to isolate
a specific subset of nodes. In this paper we will approximate an honest node as
“safe” simply if it is connected to other honest nodes in the local sense.
2.1 Preliminaries
Let S1, S2 be the strategy sets of the defender and the attacker, respectively.
Below we define U : S1 × S2 → R to the defender’s utility in the game (the
attacker’s utility is −U , this is a 2-player zero-sum game). Recall that strategy
s1 ∈ S1 is called an L-safety-level strategy iff ∀s2 ∈ S2, U(s1, s2) ≥ L (a similar
definition can be stated for player 2).
Denote V as the set of peers (either honest or those owned by the attacker)
in the network. Let H be the number of connections the defender creates (as in
Bitcoin implementation, we use a configurable constant).
We further assume that the attacker gains some value Watt from a successful
attack against the defender (and that the defender suffers this as a loss).
Cost Functions We assume the attacker can corrupt or acquire a subset A
of nodes from the universe V at a cost that we denote by C(A), where C :
2V → R≥0. Intuitively there are many choices for such functions (constant cost,
costs that are relative to the round trip time and many more). In this paper,
for simplicity, we mainly focus on a specific cost function, in which acquiring
an IP range costs cnew and every IP from that range costs cnode, assuming
C(A) = cnew · number of masks in A + cnode · |A|.
We start the discussion with the general cost function, where we prove some
interesting theoretical theorems. After that, in section 5, we use the IP range
costs, conclude the main practical theorem, and evaluate the results.
2.2 The Limitless-Buffer Game
The 2-player zero-sum game between attacker and defender is defined as follows:
The defender’s strategy space S1 contains possible sets of nodes that he may
connect to: S1 = {A ⊂ V : |A| = H}. The attacker’s strategy space S2 contains
subsets of the universe V that he chooses to corrupt: S2 = 2V . The attack
is considered successful iff the attacker owns all the nodes that the defender
selected. The utility function is thus U(A,B) =
{
C(B) if A 6⊂ B
C(B) −Watt if A ⊂ B
We will usually consider the game with mixed-strategy σ1 ∈ ∆S1 , σ
2 ∈ ∆S2 :
U(σ1, σ2) =
∑
B∈S2
σ2BC(B) −Watt
∑
B∈S2,A∈S1
σ1Aσ
2
BδA⊂B
in the above σkU is the probability that player k chooses the subset U ∈ S
k, and
δA⊂B is 1 if A ⊂ B, 0 otherwise.
The utility function is in fact the expected money that the attacker will pay if
he tries to attack. Therefore, the defender tries to gain a positive utility, because
this protects him from being attacked. The attacker tries to get negative utility
because this is the total value that he will earn.
2.3 The Restricted-Buffer Scenario
We wish to defend P2P networks in realistic settings so we must take buffers
and limited knowledge of the world into account. We thus define the following
refinement of the game: Assume that at any point in time the defender can
only maintain a set of potential peers in his buffer. Let B denote the buffer size
(the number of nodes for which information can be saved). The agent receives
a stream of announcements about nodes from which it selects ones to store in
the buffer. We assume honest nodes are advertised at least once in each time
period of length T (attacker nodes may be updated more frequently, as is often
the case during eclipse attacks). If a node’s details are stored in the buffer, and
the buffer is full, a different stored record must be evicted first. The node then
chooses its connections from the set of stored nodes.
Each node should specify an algorithm R that implements the functionality
that decides, based only on the cost to corrupt the nodes and unique identity
(the only revealed information), which node records to save or evict from the
buffer. As the defender, we try to find R that maximizes the minimum amount
of resources that must be invested to successfully attack.
3 Analysis with an Unrestricted Buffer
In this section we show results for the setting in which the nodes in V are known
to all. The following theorem shows that it is better for the defender to err on
the side of over-estimating the damage from an attack:
Theorem 1. Let UWi be the utility of the game in which a successful attack
causes Wi damage. If strategy σ
1, is a l-safety-level in the game with W1 and
W2 ≤W1, then σ
1 is a l-safety level in UW2 , and generally:
∀σ¯2 UW2(σ
1, σ¯2) ≥ UW1(σ
1, σ¯2) ≥ l
Proof. UW2(σ
1, σ¯2) =
∑
B∈S2 σ¯
2
BC(B)−W2
∑
B∈S2,A∈S1 σ
1
Aσ¯
2
BδA⊂B ≥∑
B∈S2
σ¯2BC(B) −W1
∑
B∈S2,A∈S1
σ1Aσ¯
2
BδA⊂B = UW1(σ
1, σ¯2) ≥ l
The first step is using the definition, the second is W2 ≤ W1, and the last step
is because σ1 is a l-safety-level in UW1 .
Next, we observe the attacker’s strategies in Nash equilibria. We show that
an attack may come in one of two forms: either the attacker corrupts no nodes
at all or he places some small probability to “cover” every node.
Lemma 1. For any Nash equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in the game it holds that either
∀B σ2B = 0, or alternatively, ∀A ∈ S
1 ∃B s.t. A ⊆ B and σ2B 6= 0.
Proof. Mark the defender’s strategy to play pure A ⊂ V with S1A. Let us now
assume that exists A ∈ S1 s.t. for all B with A ⊆ B it holds that σ2B = 0, then
the attacker never answers the defender’s strategy S1A, therefore U(S
1
A, σ
2) ≥ 0.
But it follows by the Nash equilibrium definition that U(σ1, σ2) ≥ U(S1A, σ
2).
Clearly 0 = U(σ1, 0) ≥ U(S1A, σ
2) therefore U(σ1A, σ
2) = 0.
We now show that in any Nash equilibrium, the defender places more prob-
ability on selecting more expensive sets of nodes (from the attacker’s support).
Lemma 2. Let (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium. Then ∀B1, B2 ∈ supp(σ
2) it
holds that C(B1) ≤ C(B2) if and only if
∑
A⊆B1∩S1
σ1A ≤
∑
A⊆B2∩S1
σ1A
Proof. Reminder: If v is the value of the game A and
(
σ1, σ2
)
is an equilibrium,
then any pure strategy from the support can be used to achieve it. Formally, if
σ2B 6= 0 (for some B ⊂ V ), then U
(
σ1, S2B
)
= v. Therefore:
v = U
(
σ1, S2B1
)
= C(B1)−Watt ·
∑
A⊂B1∩S1
σ1A
v = U
(
σ1, S2B2
)
= C(B2)−Watt ·
∑
A⊂B2∩S1
σ1A
The first step in each row is from B1, B2 ∈ supp(σ
2), the second is from the defi-
nition of U . Therefore C(B1)−C(B2) =Watt
(∑
A⊂B1∩S1
σ1A −
∑
A⊂B2∩S1
σ1A
)
.
So indeed C(B1) ≤ C(B2)↔
∑
A⊂B1∩S1
σ1A ≤
∑
A⊂B2∩S1
σ1A.
The next corollary is obvious, but it contains an insight that we will use in
the next sections:
Corollary 1. The probability of choosing a group of peers is determined by the
attacker’s support. I.e., let (σ1, σ2) be an equilibrium, then ∀B1, B2 ∈ supp(σ
2),
it holds that C(B1) = C(B2) if and only if
∑
U⊆B1∩S1
σ1U =
∑
U⊆B2∩S1
σ1U
4 Buffer-Restricted Implementation
We now turn to the scenario where buffers are restricted. Our goal here is to
decrease the number of nodes that we should remember in the buffer, while
achieving the same game value. We do so by changing the defender’s strategies
space using equivalence classes on S1 and then prove that it preserves the Nash
equilibrium and the game value.
Define the equivalence relation A1 ∼ A2 on sets of nodes A1, A2 ∈ S
1 if
∀(σ1, σ2) Nash equilibrium in U , holds that σ1A1 = σ
1
A2
. We will denote this
equivalence class with [A1]. Using those equivalence classes as the defender’s
strategies space (Sˆ1) we can define a new game (Uˆ).
Intuitively, in this game, the defender does not distinguish between different
connections’ sets within the same equivalence class, so he chooses one uniformly.
This definition can be also related to the cost to corrupt sets of nodes in any
attacker’s Nash strategy (as in Corollary 1).
Due to lack of space, we will not present here the full definition of Uˆ and
the analogy between the two perspectives. In a nutshell, Uˆ([A], B) is defined as
choosing uniformly strategy A1 ∈ [A] and playing it in U(A1, B). After that,
we created a mapping function T : ∆S1 → ∆Sˆ1 with
(
T (σ)
)
[A]
=
∑
b∈[A] σb
and
(
T−1(σˆ1)
)
A
=
σˆ1[A]
|[A]| . We prove that for strategies (σˆ
1, σ2) it holds that (i)
Uˆ(σˆ1, σ2) = U(T−1(σˆ1), σ2), (ii) T (T−1(σˆ1)) = σˆ1, and (iii) if (σ1, σ2) is Nash
equilibrium in U , then ∀σ′2 ∈ S2 it holds that Uˆ(T (σ1), σ′2) = U(σ1, σ′2).
Finally, we conclude the main theorem:
Theorem 2. Nash equilibria in both games have the same game value, and
(σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium in U iff (T (σ1), σ2) is a Nash equilibrium in Uˆ .
Proof. We first show that the T function saves the property of Nash equilibrium.
Let (σ1, σ2) be a Nash equilibrium in U , we want to prove that (T (σ1), σ2) is
Nash equilibrium in Uˆ . On the one hand, ∀σ′1 ∈ Sˆ1,
Uˆ(σ′1, σ2) = U(T−1(σ′1), σ2) ≤ U(σ1, σ2) = Uˆ(T (σ1), σ2)
where the first equality is (i), the second is the definition of Nash equilibrium in
U , and the last is (iii). On the other hand, ∀σ′2 ∈ S2
Uˆ(T (σ1), σ′2) = U(σ1, σ′2) ≥ U(σ1, σ2) = Uˆ(T (σ1), σ2)
where the first and last equality are (iii), and the second is the definition of Nash
equilibrium.
Then we prove that this is a Nash equilibrium. And clearly, they have the
same value due to (iii): U(σ1, σ2) = Uˆ(T (σ1), σ2)
Corollary 2. Defender’s safety level l in Uˆ can be translated to safety level ≥ l
in U .
Proof. Let σˆ1 ∈ Sˆ1 be a safety level l in Uˆ . Indeed, ∀σ2 ∈ S2, U(T−1(σˆ1), σ2) =
Uˆ(σˆ1, σ2) ≥ l where the equality on the left is (i), and the inequality on the right
is the definition of safety level l in Uˆ .
Equivalent peers For reasons that will become clear below, define a new
equivalence relation on V : Two nodes u, v are equivalent if for any set of other
nodes A, adding u to A results in a strategically equivalent set to A ∪ {v}.
Formally: ∀v, u ∈ V , mark that u ⇋ v if ∀A ⊂ V, |A| = H − 1 it holds that
A ∪ {u} ∼ A ∪ {v}. Let [v]⇋ denote the equivalence class of node v ∈ V , and
the equivalence classes space with Vˆ := {[v]⇋|v ∈ V }.
Note that [{v1, · · · , vH}] 6= [v1]⇋ × · · · × [vH ]⇋ and generally there is no
containment in either direction (see Lemma 5 for a specific interesting property).
4.1 The Buffer Management Algorithm
In this section we propose a concrete way of implementing the buffer management
algorithm R (as described in subsection 2.3), that utilizes a Bloom filter.
A Bloom filter [2] is a data structure that uses hash-coded information to
encode a set of items. It allows for some small fraction of errors in membership
tests (false positives). The error rate can be lowered by increasing memory usage.
In our paper, we use this method to avoid nodes that we already saw including
those evicted from the buffer. We use the Bloom filter’s deterministic answer
to completely avoid known nodes, and accept a small fraction of false-positive
answers on new nodes.
The next theorem discusses the benefits of well-implemented buffer manage-
ment algorithms, and the following lemma gives a possible implementation:
Theorem 3. Assume that we have some buffer management algorithm R that
satisfies the conditions from subsection 2.3, and in addition it has the property
that choosing uniformly a node from [A] inside the limited buffer has the same
probability as choosing it uniformly from [A] inside the entire inputs.
Then we can implement any Nash strategy or safety level on a restricted
buffer of size O(H · |Sˆ1|) with the same value as the game on a limitless buffer.
Proof. Store H nodes for any equivalence class in Sˆ1. Using the described prop-
erty, ∀[A] ∈ Sˆ1, choosing a connection set uniformly in [A] from the set of nodes
in the buffer is the same as choosing it uniformly from the entire input. There-
fore, we can play any strategy σˆ1 in the game Uˆ by uniformly selecting a group
in the buffer that is in the chosen equivalence class.
Therefore, we implement a choice that is equivalent to the defender’s strat-
egy space Sˆ1 in the game Uˆ . Let σ2 be an attacker strategy. The value of the
game that was played in this buffer-limited world is exactly Uˆ(σˆ1, σ2). Finally, if
this is a Nash equilibrium/ safety-level strategy, then U(T−1(σˆ1), σ2) is a Nash
equilibrium/ safety-level in U (Theorem 2/Corollary 2 resp.).
Consider Algorithm 1 with: EG as the equivalence classes (“buckets”) in our
game, bucket size as the number of nodes that each bucket can hold, B ∈ N as
the size in bytes of the Bloom filter, and Prob(p) to be true with probability p
(if p ≥ 1 it is always true).
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 with EG = Sˆ1 and optimal filter1 satisfies the condi-
tions of Theorem 3.
Proof. For any equivalence class in the defender’s strategy space (“bucket”), we
should prove the following claim: If we choose a node uniformly from the bucket
that we stored in the buffer, then it has the same probability as choosing it
uniformly from all the nodes that the defender is notified about and belong to
this equivalence class (i.e., the case where the bucket size is infinite). Assume
that we make the choice after being notified of l nodes in this bucket. We need
1 filter without false positive or false negative.
Initialize:
BF := Bloom-filter buffer of size B.
∀ bucket ∈ EG: bucket history[bucket]=0
∀ bucket ∈ EG: buckets[bucket]=∅
while n := new input node do
if not BF.contains(n) then
b := n.bucket
bucket history[b] ++
if Prob( bucket size
bucket history[b]
) then
if buckets[b].isFull then
buckets[b].uniformlyRemoveOne
end
buckets[b].add(n)
end
BF.add(n)
end
end
Algorithm 1: R algorithm for EG
to prove that there is a chance of 1
l
to choose any node. Indeed, ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , l},
we insert it into the buffer with probability bucket size
j
and after the next input
it is still there with probability (1 − bucket size
j+1
1
bucket size
) = j
j+1 , so after the
l’th input: j
j+1
j+1
j+2 · · ·
l−1
l
= j
l
, therefore the total probability of the node vj to
be in the bucket after l inputs is simply bucket size
j
· j
l
= bucket size
l
. Finally, the
probability of choosing any node from the bucket is bucket size
l
· 1
bucket size
= 1
l
(we choose uniformly in the bucket), which is exactly the same probability as
choosing it from all the l input nodes.
Continuous Games: Refreshing the Buffer and Bloom Filter The above
algorithm works for a single “round”, where we are a node in the network, estab-
lishing the known nodes list, and choosing connections for the next round. This
is not enough for a continuous game, where nodes in the network come and go
frequently, and we need to choose connections repeatedly, using the same buffer.
To overcome this difficulty, we can direct the network protocol to propagate live
nodes every T time units, and store two copies of the buffer and filter that reset
alternately every 2T time units. This method gives us the ability to remember
IPs from a window of T , which is the full available information on the network
(as we’ve assumed honest nodes send their IP address to others at least once
every T ).
Additionally, in more realistic scenarios in which churn is an issue, and honest
nodes may be offline at times, we suggest using larger bucket sizes to preserve a
sufficiently large set of alternative connections.
In the full version of the paper, we prove that even if some IPs in the bucket
cannot be selected, e.g., if they are stale, selecting uniformly from the remaining
nodes in the bucket is equivalent again to a uniform selection (from the whole
input nodes).
4.2 Constant Cost Function
As a benchmark, and a simple example of the applications of the results we
present, we consider the scenario in which there is a constant cost to every
node. This is an interesting scenario because in this case the defender doesn’t
distinguish between any two nodes.
Using the notation of subsection 2.1, let C(U) = c · |U |. I.e., if the defender
will choose the subset of nodes A and the attacker corrupts B, then the utility
of the game is c · |B| −Watt · δA⊂B.
Due to Lemma 2 and the symmetry of the nodes in this example, in all
the Nash equilibria in the game, the defender will choose any group of nodes
A ⊂ V, |A| = H with the same probability. In this case, it is easy to see that
there is a single defender’s equivalence class. Using Algorithm 1 with |EG| = 1
and Theorem 3, gives the optimal game value.
For example, let us look at the network with nodes V = v1, · · · , vl. For the
defender, it is best to uniformly select nodes over all V . Using Algorithm 1 with
|EG| = 1, bucket size = H gives us exactly what we need: H nodes that are
uniformly distributed over all the input (same proof as in Lemma 3).
5 Costs by IP Masks
For the rest of the paper and the restricted-buffer case, we focus on the specific
game where the cost function is determined by the IP subnet mask (as described
in Subsection 2.1). A similar treatment applies to other cost functions.
Lemma 4. If v1, v2 are nodes in the same mask, then [v1]⇋ = [v2]⇋.
I.e., for all A ⊂ V with |A| = H − 1 and ∀(σ1, σ2) Nash equilibrium, it holds
that σ1
A∪{v1}
= σ1
A∪{v2}
.
The proof is easy, and it can be found in the full version of the paper.
The following lemma shows that we can save representatives from each equiv-
alence class.
Lemma 5. For any defender’s strategy A = {v1, · · · , vH} ∈ S
1, it holds that:
[v1]⇋× · · · × [vH ]⇋ ⊆ [A] I.e., we can replace any node with a node in the same
mask, and still be in the same strategy equivalence class.
Proof. Our cost function does not distinguish between two nodes in the same
mask, so we may switch any node with another one in the same mask, and it
will cost the same =⇒ Choosing them unequally will ease the attacker’s game
(according to Lemma 4) =⇒We will choose them with the same probability.
We derive our main practical result as a direct consequence:
Theorem 4. We can implement the IP mask game on a limited buffer, with the
same game value as the limitless-buffer game.
Proof. On one hand, we can implement any defender’s strategy [v1, · · · , vH ]
using [v1]⇋, · · · , [vH ]⇋ (Lemma 5). On the other hand, we can implement any
[v]⇋ using subnet masks (Lemma 4). Finally, by using the masks as buckets, we
can implement any strategy in Sˆ1.
5.1 Safety Level
Due to many difficulties in completely solving the original game, in this sub-
section we define the game U¯ wherein we limit the defender by reducing his
available strategies. Those restrictions give us only a safety level for the original
game; however, it makes it easier to compute the strategies.
First, note that the defender should not distinguish between two masks that
have the same number of nodes (in any equilibrium, masks with the same num-
ber of nodes are selected with the same probability). Therefore, the strategic
equivalence classes are defined by mask size.
Denote a few marks: (i) Ma the number of all the nodes in all the masks of
size a; (ii) avga =
cnew+a·cnode
a
the average cost of node; (iii) xa ∈ N the number
of nodes that the attacker corrupts in masks of size a. Therefore, the attacker
invests at least xa · avga money, and the fraction of corrupted nodes is
xa
Ma
.
Now, we ease the game by limiting the defender in two ways2: He cannot dis-
tinguish between two masks with the same size, and he must choose connections
independently, each with probability pa.
Denote the random variable ya ∼ Bin(H, pa) as the defender’s choice to
choose from mask-size a, and x′a as xa if xa 6= 0 or Ma(1− E(ya))
1
ya otherwise.
Then U¯(x¯, y¯) ≥
∑
a xa · avga −Watt ·
∏
a
(
x′a
Ma
)ya
, and because
x′a
Ma
≤ 1 we get
≥
∑
a xa · avga −Watt ·
∏
a
(
x′a
Ma
)
.
I.e., the game value increases linearly with large constants but decreases
exponentially with small constants. We will see that these constants make the
game unprofitable for any attacker.
Evaluate the value of U¯ To retrieve an actual value for the calculation above,
we examined the behavior of the Bitcoin network. We collected a snapshot of all
the nodes that connected to the network (using an honest node in the network
and IPs from the site blockchain.info). From this data we collected statistics on
the number of masks, and distribution of nodes within each one (see Figures 1
and 2).
We calculated the sizes of each mask size and got:
∏
a
1
Ma
≈ 8.991 · 10−52.
Therefore the attacker needs to invest huge amounts of resources to gain a neg-
ative value.
2 We do so because it is hard to solve the original game.
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Fig. 1: Number of subnet masks\16 in the Bitcoin network (Sep. 2015
data).
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Fig. 2: Number of masks in each mask-size node from a mask.
5.2 Comparing to a Naive Benchmark
In this section we compare our results to a naive benchmark, where each node
chooses its connections uniformly from the buffer, and the buffer is chosen uni-
formly from the whole network. In the first benchmark (the most naive), we
assume that the node may be subject to repeated transmissions of the same
IP, which it cannot detect unless that IP is already in the buffer. We assume
that the buffer size is the current buffer size of Bitcoin’s nodes (= 20480 unique
addr.). For the second benchmark, we assume uniform selection of IPs, but with
an accompanying Bloom filter to filter out re-transmissions. We consider a net-
work respectively to the masks in Bitcoin’s topology. Considering our strategy,
an attacker’s response is to create nodes in such a way that pa is identical for any
mask a. Then, we calculate the probability of being successfully attacked as a
function of the attacker’s investment. We choose the value H = 8 using the num-
ber of connections that Bitcoin currently uses by default. The value for cnew
cnode
is
deduced using the approximated prices on Amazon EC2. The results are shown
in Figure 3 along with the probability that our own algorithm is successfully
attacked. 3
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Fig. 3: The probability of a successful attack by invested money.
6 Future Work & Conclusions
In this work we explored a game theoretic model for P2P network formation.
Our results indicate that by using a model for the cost of nodes for an attacker,
it is possible to select each peer’s connections so as to reduce the likelihood
of being isolated by an attacker. We presented an example strategy that can
be implemented in any P2P software’s code (e.g. Bitcoin, BitTorrent, etc.). We
then examined the cost of a successful attack in our model, and compared the
results to other strategies.
Future work should extend the model to games that are not zero-sum, and try
to better account for attackers attempting to isolate large chunks of the network
(simulations we conducted show that the strategies that protect single nodes
are also good for the network as a whole). As a motivated example, splitting the
network into chunks in Bitcoin may disrupt the proportions of the computational
power of the attacker and ease double-spending attacks.
This paper uses a single, existing network utility for the cost function (the IP
mask) to ease the implementation on current applications. This is not mandatory,
and there is more information about peers that we can utilize such as round-trip
time, traceroute, and other network features. Another possibility is to augment
nodes with additional information that will be hard for an attacker to fake.
3 The “spike” in the graph is caused by the number of existing masks (if the attacker
corrupts in all masks). In this case, the probability of a successful attack is the same
as in the naive approach.
For example, it may be interesting to examine the proof-of-work concept as
something that increases the reliability of a peer.
Finally, we used a specific strategy and compared it to other benchmarks.
Finding a way to solve the game mathematically (without assumptions or heuris-
tic strategies), or finding a defender’s strategy that is in some Nash equilibrium,
will create the optimal algorithm for any mask-based P2P system. This creates
an optimal solution that we can all hope for within this model.
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